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CENTRAL

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. · 25X1	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN				
25/1	19 March 1959				
	DAILY BRIEF				
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC					
w	Watch Committee conclusionBerlin: Although the Soviets could turn over Berlin access controls to the East Germans with little or no warning, available evidence does not indicate that they intend to do so in the immediate future.				
25X1	Communist China - Yugoslavia: Peiping has formally accused Tito of 'fabrication' when he alleged that Premier Chou En-lai had asked Indonesian officials not to welcome him during his recent trip. Tito can be expected to retaliate with further attacks on Peiping in accord with his newly stated pol-				
K	icy of answering bloc attacks 'blow for blow.' Nevertheless, Belgrade announced the signing of the 1959 trade agreement with the Chinese on the same day that Peiping's protest was made. USSR-UAR: Moscow has followed up Khrushchev's 16 March				
-M	criticism of Nasir's anti-Qasim, anti-Communist moves with press and radio charges that Nasir's attacks on the Qasim regime "can be welcomed only by the imperialists." Ambassador Thompson, in commenting on Khrushchev's speech, states that the split between Moscow and Cairo "appears certain to widen." UAR propaganda organs have now begun direct accusations that the USSR wants "to subject the entire Arab area to Communism."				
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		estimated that the on 17 March. Thi Jordanian armisti	The UN Truce Supervisor re were 13 or 14 Israeli tans deployment, in violation oce agreement, coincides with	ks in Jerusalem f the Israeli- th the w <u>ithdrawal</u>	25X1
	Γ	of certain Jordani	an military units from West	Jordan	
*1					
	W	cent influx of an u column" activity i ported to have ent completion of pas believes the influ	Kuwaiti Government is conc nusual number of Iraqis ma n the oil-rich sheikdom. So ered recently and 4,000 mor sport formalities. The Ame is primarily a reflection of but sees an increase in subv	y presage ''fifth ome 500 are re- re to be awaiting rican Consulate f Iraq's eco-	25X1
	25X1	ceptible of direct	ittee conclusion—Middle Ea exploitation by Sino-Soviet ardize US interests exist in an and Iraq. The situation i	bloc hostile action the Middle East, n the area remains	
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precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities
is unlikely in the immediate future.

Iraq: The drift of Iraq toward Communist control is accelerating with the continuing elimination of elements in opposition to the Qasim government.

Jordan: The absence of King Husayn and Prime Minister
Rifai from Jordan has provided opportunity for intensified political activity among disaffected elements,

Japan: There is increasing likelihood that Japan's ties
with the US will be the primary issue in the forthcoming Japanese election campaign. The Socialists apparently are shifting from their policy of "neutrality" and moving toward a pro-

Communist line. Not only have they decided to join the Communists in opposition to the US-Japan security treaty, but, in a joint communique with Chinese Communist leaders, a Socialist

mission in Peiping identified itself generally with the Commu-

nist position on Asian questions.

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West Berlin: Economic indicators reveal no general deterioration in the past week. For the first time, however, they record a definite decline in new industrial orders which may reflect an increasing apprehension over Berlin's political future. This decline, which is noted in heavy industry as well as consumer-goods orders received during January, will have no immediate effect but may show up in production and employment levels later in the year.

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Peiping Protests Tito Remarks

Peiping formally accused Tito, in a note given to the Yugoslav chargé on 18 March, of "fabrication" in stating that Premier Chou En-lai had asked Indonesians "not to welcome" the Yugoslav President. In denying that Chou made this statement, the Chinese may be trying to undermine the credibility of Tito's comments to Asian leaders. During his recent tour, Tito attempted, in an effort to build stronger ties with "neutrals," to stimulate greater apprehension of Peiping and the implacably hostile nature of its "Stalinist" brand of Communism.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been "frozen" at chargé level since mid-1958, but the Chinese protest does not seem to foreshadow a complete rupture. The 1959 Sino-Yugoslav trade agreement was signed the same day the protest was made. While the trade goal of \$7,000,000 in this agreement is 60 percent lower than in 1958, trade between the two countries has largely been artificial since it began in 1956. By signing it, Peiping continues to parallel Khrushchev, who said Belgrade would be fought "every step of the way" on ideological matters without breaking off other relations, including trade. Communist China may consider renewal of the agreement a useful device to counter charges that the bloc's external trade relations are affected by ideological considerations.

Belgrade is certain to retaliate with even more violent attacks against Peiping in accord with its newly stated policy of answering bloc attacks "blowfor blow." As in its strained relations with Tirana, however, Belgrade also will be careful not to break diplomatic ties because of the damage this would cause to its international advocacy of coexistence among all

states.

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Israelis Move Tanks Into Jerusalem

UN truce officials and American consular personnel have observed Israeli tanks moving individually by night into Jerusalem during the past two weeks. The UN Truce Supervisory Organization estimated that 13 or 14 tanks had arrived as of 17 March.

	Their presence in Jerusalen raeli-Jordanian General Armisti related to Israeli anticipation of	ice Agreement, could be	25X ²
1	Igrael might evoloit an	y large-scale disturbance by	
	occupying the balance of Jerusal- Jordan, especially if it appeared	em and possibly even West	
	backed by the UAR. Jordanian s	strength near the city has	
	been reduced by the recent withd	rawal of an infantry regi-	05)
	ment from the Jerusalem area.		25X
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Japanese Socialists Adopt Pro-Communist Line

The Japanese Socialists apparently are shifting from a policy of "neutrality" and adopting a strong pro-Communist line which they hope will increase their popular appeal in important forthcoming elections in Japan. Socialist Secretary General Inejiro Asanuma, who headed a Socialist mission to Peiping, on 17 March issued a joint communique with Chinese Communist leaders in which he accepted the Communist position on many Asian issues.

Among these are Peiping's denunciation of the Kishi government, the view that the "liberation" of Taiwan is an internal matter, Communist China's call for a nuclear-free zone in Asia, and the substitution of a four-power collective-security pact for the Sino-Soviet and US-Japan security treaties. Earlier Asanuma had termed the United States the "common enemy" of Japan and China for its "occupation" of Okinawa and Taiwan.

Asanuma's actions, in conjunction with the recent Socialist decision to form a united front with the Communist party, the leftist Sohyo labor federation, and other leftists in an all-out attack on the US-Japan security treaty, point to the likelihood that the upper-house elections in June will be contested on the issues of Japan's ties with the United States and with Communist China. Thus far, however, the Japanese press has been strongly critical of the Socialist moves.

Peiping's stand, accepted by Asanuma, that trade and political issues must be "settled simultaneously" is intended to emphasize that any temporary, limited trade which may be arranged is merely a "relief measure." Apparently the Chinese Communists fear that any limited agreement, such as that proposed for Japan's lacquer industry, could be construed in Japan as a concession and would therefore justify Kishi's "wait-and-see" policy. In the communique the Chinese Communists went even beyond their previous position, saying that at present the solution of political questions "must be given preference."

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Overt French Military and Rightist Opposition to De Gaulle On Algeria Likely

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There are indications that some die-hard elements in the French armed forces may join rightist civilian groups in openly opposing De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Army General Massu on 1 March, in his first 'political speech" in recent months, described the May 1958 revolt by French military leaders in Algeria as "an event of profound significance which still escapes many" and referred pointedly to the integration of Algeria with

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France as one of its objectives.

There have been

numerous army complaints recently that efforts to win the support of the mass of the Moslem population are severely handicapped by De Gaulle's continued refusal to espouse "integration."

French military and rightist groups, who regard any proposed settlement of the Algerian problem short of complete victory as "abandonment," are probably being spurred toward early action by leaks of De Gaulle's previously reported intention to hold a referendum in France on the question of continuing the There is increasing evidence that a majority of the public wants an end to the war and would probably support a 'liberal''

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solution if De Gaulle proposed one.

(Extremist European settlers in Algeria, particularly veterans' organizations, have become openly hostile to De Gaulle, and are regrouping as a result of the government's clemency measures toward Algerian rebels and of the announcement that the municipal elections in April will be conducted under a new law favoring Moslem candidates. Although De Gaulle's steps to split the military-settler front of 1958 had appeared successful, the settlers are continuing their efforts to regain military support and are likely to stage a major demonstration in Algiers on 22 March when Jouhaud decorates air force reservists there.

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Decline in West Berlin Industrial Orders Noted for First Time

Economic indicators for West Berlin reveal no general deterioration during the past week. For the first time, however, there has been a definite decline in new industrial orders. The index number for new orders for January fell to 184 compared with 218 in December and 203 in January of last year. Large declines were reported in comparison with this time last year in structural steel, transportation equipment, machinery, and electrical equipment. For the electrical industry. Berlin's largest manufacturer with 30 percent of the industrial output and labor force, new orders dropped from an index of 240 in January 1958 to 194 in January 1959.

The downturn reflects a lower volume of orders not only from West German markets but locally and for export to foreign countries. The consumer-goods industry also registered some declines in paper products, printing, leather goods, and textiles. However, new orders for chemicals, ceramics, building materials, and iron and steel products increased.

American officials in Berlin report that some of the decline may be due to economic factors in West Germany, as well as to increasing pessimism over the city's future. Because of backlogs, the effect of the declines will not be noticeable in the levels of production and employment for several months. It is estimated that a 50-percent decline in new orders would almost double Berlin's present unemployment figure of ap-

proximately 90,000.

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